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1 INTRODUCTION  
The use of atomic energy, whether for 
scientific research, medical applications or 
electricity generation has become commonplace in 
the modern world. Such practices regularly raise 
concerns about its relevance and its impact. These 
concerns resurface each time an event with 
complex economic, social and environmental 
consequences occurs. Examples include the 
incidents and accidents at Three Mile Island in 
1979 (Perrow 1999), Chernobyl in 1986 and more 
recently at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi in March 2011. 
All three were also opportunities for a more 
general reflection on the operation of the 
installations concerned.  
However, normal operations and the planned 
phases of the life cycle of nuclear facilities also 
provide an opportunity to learn about the 
technical, economic and organisational challenges 
these facilities face together with the associated 
risks and how to overcome them. The 
decommissioning of nuclear power plants is one 
of these sensitive situations. This is major 
challenge for nuclear power risk management, and 
as such, requires careful thought about how to 
categorise these risks.  
This article is in three parts. The first defines 
nuclear decommissioning, specifies its principal 
characteristics and identifies its main international 
strategies. The second outlines the importance of 
the context for decommissioning and its 
associated risks. Finally, the last section presents a 
typology of risks divided into three main families.  
2 UNDERSTANDING DECOMMISSIONING  
Decommissioning is a long and complex 
process. Although it is the final phase of the life 
cycle of nuclear facilities, it is not homogenous. 
National and international supervisory bodies 
have identified timescales and strategies for 
decommissioning that have been implemented in 
countries where nuclear decommissioning is 
already a reality.  
2.1 Definitions 
It is first necessary to understand what 
decommissioning means and its place in the life 
cycle of nuclear facilities.  
Nuclear decommissioning concerns all nuclear 
facilities regardless of size and function. It 
encompasses research facilities (reactors and 
colliders), medical facilities, military installations, 
industrial plants for electricity generation (nuclear 
power plants) and facilities that use nuclear 
energy for other industrial purposes. While these 
facilities are very different in their design and 
radioactive power, the issues of radiation, the 
environment and technology are similar. 
Likewise, risks related to the handling of 
radioactive materials and the importance of risk 
management in decommissioning are the same, 
demonstrated notably by accidents in the medical 
domain (IAEA 1988). However, in this article we 
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focus on electricity power generation facilities, 
which have received more attention, both in the 
literature and in the political, social, scientific and 
media spheres.  
There are four main phases in the life cycle of 
nuclear power plants: construction, production, 
temporary shutdowns and decommissioning. 
Decommissioning therefore forms part of the 
history of the installation; it inherits the same 
technical and organizational characteristics seen in 
the construction and production phases.  
Decommissioning describes the overall process 
for the preparation, implementation and execution 
of the operations necessary for the “removal of 
some or all of the regulatory controls that apply to 
a nuclear site” (NEA/OECD 2002). It therefore 
concerns making facilities safe when they cease to 
be operational and changing their regulatory 
status. The facility must be made secure for the 
individuals working there, the general population 
and the environment (Bayliss & Langley 2003).  
Dismantling is a more precisely defined 
activity that aims to physically destroy facilities: it 
concerns the work to be carried out. 
Decommissioning may therefore include the 
dismantling of a part of, or an entire building, but 
it can also be confined to the removal from the site 
of radioactive elements and the decontamination 
of the building for subsequent use. In this article, 
we focus on decommissioning in a global sense, 
which integrates upstream preparations and 
downstream activities surrounding the effective 
shutdown of production in nuclear facilities.  
Although integrated into the overall life cycle 
of a nuclear power plant, decommissioning takes 
place within a specific timeframe and has 
particular characteristics.  
2.2 Timeframe and characteristics  
Nuclear decommissioning takes place with a 
particular timeframe that creates many 
fundamental challenges related to its management, 
and is defined by a particular set of characteristics. 
The first point to note is that decommissioning 
takes place over a long or very long timeframe. 
Reactors such as Three Mile Island 2 in the United 
States, which was shut down following an 
incident in 1979 (US NRC 2013) or the 
decommissioning of Brennilis, a French nuclear 
power plant, which began 1985 (ASN 2013) have 
not yet reached the end of the process, and the 
Fukushima Dai-Ichi plant is currently being 
prepared for a minimum 40-year 
decommissioning process according to its 
operator, the Tokyo Electric Company (TEPCO 
2013). This long timescale creates challenges in 
terms of cost management (NEA/OECD 2003), 
organisational management and supervision of 
operations (Martin & Guarnieri 2013).  
Decommissioning is not homogeneous. 
Experiences are characterised by huge differences 
in the number of facilities that are in production, 
under construction, undergoing decommissioning 
or being dismantled. While the vast majority of 
commercial reactors are still in production, and 
operators have little experience of 
decommissioning (it is also the case for particle 
accelerators), research reactors and units that 
produce fuel or materials for the nuclear industry 
have more experience (IAEA 2004). 
Decommissioning is characterised by the highly 
exploratory nature of its techniques, organisational 
changes (Pelleterat de Borde et al. 2013), skills 
and staff management, and management of 
subcontractors. The actors involved in nuclear 
decommissioning regularly compare it to 
shutdown operations (Martin & Guarnieri 2013). 
The comparison, although fundamentally different 
in terms of timescale, is valid from the point of 
view of the heavy dependence on outsourcing and 
the potential over-exposure of workers to 
radiation. It could be said that decommissioning is 
a paradoxical phase in the life cycle of nuclear 
facilities. Although it is always strictly governed 
by regulations that guarantee operations are 
carried out safely, the timescale and constraints 
are very different to that of maintenance 
operations during the functionning period. This 
disparity creates situations that are complex for 
the facility’s actors to manage.  
This section has shown that decommissioning, 
which is a complex process with multiple 
challenges, does not constitute a homogeneous 
field for research. However, international 
organisations, as we will see, have sought to limit 
decommissioning to one description. These stages 
and strategies attempt to standardise the process at 
the international level.  
2.3 The international context  
The international nuclear decommissioning 
landscape is characterised not only by the 
available technology, the age of facilities and their 
importance in different national contexts, but also 
by choices that are often a matter of national 
policy. In particular, they relate to requirements 
concerning acceptable conditions for unrestricted 
re-use. In terms of decommissioning options, the 
Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) specify that, “there is no 
unique or preferred approach to Decommissioning 
and Dismantling of nuclear facilities” 
(NEA/OECD 2002). One of the main differences 
between countries concerns clearance levels for 
facilities and waste that, for example, do not exist 
in France unlike other nuclear countries. This 
difference has important implications for waste 
management and the reuse of nuclear facilities 
(French Ministry of Environmental Protection 
2013; NEA/OECD 2006).  
However, there are several internationally 
recognised phases or stages in nuclear 
decommissioning and three major strategies are 
recognised by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA). Bayliss and Langley identify 
three distinct decommissioning stages (Bayliss & 
Langley 2003). These stages may be interspersed 
with periods of inactivity that leave time for 
radioactive decay. In the case of reactors, the first 
stage is to empty them of fuel and coolants and to 
remove sources of radiation. Equipment that is 
easily broken down is also removed and the 
facility is prepared for a monitoring period and 
future dismantling. The second stage is to 
decontaminate the facility by removing, as far as 
possible, sources of radiation and parts that can be 
easily deconstructed. The last stage aim is to 
obtain the declassification of the installation by 
removing the remaining radioactive elements in 
order for the site to obtain greenfield (un-
restricted use, or a return to the pre-construction 
installation status) or brownfield status (with use 
or development restrictions due to former nuclear 
use).  
At present, as the study by Bayliss and Langley 
(Bayliss & Langley 2003) shows, the IAEA 
defines an operational continuum consisting of 
several phases: the operational phase, the shut-
down transition phase (Pelleterat de Borde and al. 
2013), preparation for safe enclosure, the safe 
enclosure period and final dismantling. However, 
it does not seem useful to contrast these two 
approaches (stages or phases). The phases 
proposed by the international literature tend to be 
a specific modality of the final period of the 
facility’s life cycle, namely phased dismantling 
(IAEA 2004).  
The IAEA defines three decommissioning 
strategies, which are broken down by country 
according to national policy, the type of 
installation (e.g. radioactive decay does not apply 
to plutonium processing facilities) and regulation 
(IAEA 2004). Describing these activities in terms 
of different strategies is probably also an 
exaggeration: it is more the case that the first two 
strategies represent two options regarding the 
timeframe for decommissioning, while the latter 
does not strictly deal with decommissioning.  
The first strategy is immediate dismantlement. 
It consists of immediately decommissioning the 
facility, without waiting for the radioactive decay 
of its contents. The goal is to reach, as quickly as 
possible, the end point defined by the rules; 
typically declassification. This strategy 
presupposes that there is an efficient nuclear waste 
processing chain: if not, timescales will be 
affected by the ability of the system to cope. In 
theory, the phases of dismantlement immediately 
succeed each other, without any intermediate 
lapses in time. Immediate dismantlement has been 
the preferred choice in, for example, France – 
despite the fact that the nuclear waste processing 
chain is not fully established. This leads to 
situations where temporary storage is used on 
decommissioned sites.  
The second strategy is called deferred 
dismantlement, safe enclosure or safe storage. It 
aims to benefit from the time needed for 
radioactive decay to empty and secure the facility 
(stages 1 and 2). The IAEA argues that this 
strategy has several advantages, of which the 
principal are that workers are protected from 
radiation and there is an increased ability to raise 
funds for the future decommissioning work (stage 
3). This strategy essentially aims to delay the 
transition from stage 2 to stage 3.  
The third strategy is called entombment: the 
goal is to bring the facility (usually research 
facilities or powerful reactors) to a stable state that 
requires minimal monitoring. Equipment and 
radioactive materials are entombed in a solid 
structure not intended for deconstruction The 
IAEA describes it as follows: “this essentially 
means that the site becomes a near surface waste 
disposal site” (IAEA 2004).  
These examples show that decommissioning 
strategies and the stages of deconstruction are 
more general guidelines that reproducible 
operational blueprints. They can orient 
understanding of risk management and indicate 
the priorities to be given to risks arising from 
decommissioning. However, the reality of 
decommissioning is very different, as the next part 
of this article will highlight.  
3 THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT 
The difference between how decommissioning 
is expected to work, as described by the IAEA, 
and specific situations observed in the real world 
highlights the emergence of new risks and shows 
that the decommissioning context is extremely 
important.  
3.1 Theory vs. practice: the impact of context  
One of the key elements of nuclear 
decommissioning is the ability of operators to 
anticipate, prepare and plan both prior to, and 
during the decommissioning itself. These concepts 
are at the heart of the difficulties highlighted by 
the IAEA in the decommissioning process. 
Preparations made by operators influence the 
entire process, particularly with respect to risk 
management (exposure to radiation, 
organisational, human and economic risks) and 
skills. The transition between production and 
decommissioning is a sensitive phase of 
deconstruction process and can take up to two 
years (Bayliss & Langley 2003). However, this 
ideal scenario: preparation, implementation, and 
monitoring, with specific timeframes dedicated to 
each stage can be undermined by the international, 
political, social and economic context in which 
operations are carried out. Bayliss and Langley are 
extremely clear on this point, “Ideally, adequate 
notice should be given of the intention to shut a 
plant – up to 2 years is required to carry out the 
required planning work. In reality, the decision to 
shut down a plant is often precipitated by adverse 
commercial circumstances, which may leave less 
time to plan the transition”, (Bayliss & Langley 
2003).  
The current international decommissioning 
landscape appears to be more a matter of 
exploratory techniques and methods than 
industrial implementation. Despite the sweeping 
assertions of industry and international 
organisations for whom, “many nuclear facilities 
have already been successfully decommissioned 
and dismantled” decommissioning operations 
continue to be very heterogeneous and 
exploratory. In fact, as IAEA statistics show 
(IAEA 2004), decommissioning has so far mainly 
concerned small facilities, plutonium processing 
plants and research reactors. In 2003, the vast 
majority of commercial reactors were still in 
production (446 operating, 45 under construction, 
107 shutdown undergoing decommissioning and 
14 successfully decommissioned). This shows that 
the decommissioning of large facilities is still in 
the experimental phase, and technical and 
organisational solutions are mainly responses to 
specific contexts.  
The decommissioning context is important not 
only in terms of technology (type of facility, size), 
but also in terms of the events that led to the 
decision to shut down the facility. Conditions are 
not exactly the same when decommissioning is 
anticipated far in advance (Pelleterat de Borde et 
al. 2013) and when it is the result of a political 
decision or an accident.  
3.2 Three examples of unanticipated 
decommissioning  
Unanticipated or unprepared decommissioning 
is an important factor to be taken into account 
when examining the risks created by this phase of 
the life cycle of nuclear facilities. Here we take 
three examples of decommissioning conducted in 
poorly-prepared situations, show how these 
contexts may compromise the smooth execution 
of operations and lead to the emergence, if not of 
new risks, at least to a change in their relative 
importance. These examples concern 
decommissioning conducted in degraded 
conditions: the first due to a political decision, the 
second due to a nuclear accident of regional 
significance, and the third due to war and a 
permanent loss of knowledge of the facilities.  
SuperPhénix was a French industrial fast 
breeder reactor prototype. Construction ended in 
1985 and it began production in 1986. Throughout 
its life, operations were interrupted by short or 
longer-term outages due to various technical and 
administrative problems. In 1997, the French 
government decided to permanently shut it down, 
despite the fact that it was in the midst of the ten-
year maintenance period and ready to restart 
effective operations. This decision, taken in the 
context of a change of government and political 
negotiations, pushed the facility into a 
decommissioning phase that the plant’s actors had 
neither prepared for nor imagined. In the opinion 
of actors and observers, this unanticipated 
decommissioning of an operational facility led to 
professional trauma that had an influence on risk 
management. The speed of decommissioning, the 
objective to keep the experienced personnel of 
operational teams in this new phase of the plant’s 
life cycle and how to carry out the most difficult 
operations were identified by the facility’s own 
employees as challenges (Rodriguez et al. 2004).  
Our second example concerns the 
decommissioning of the Fukushima Dai-Ichi 
nuclear plant in Japan. These boiling water 
reactors were commissioned between 1971 (Unit 
1) and 1979 (Unit 6). Units 1–4 suffered serious 
damage as a result of events of March 2011 and 
the operator TEPCO decided, together with the 
Japanese government, to implement a 
comprehensive forty-year decommissioning 
programme (TEPCO 2013). However, the extent 
of the damage and the fusion of three of the four 
reactor cores (Units 1–3) radically transformed the 
decommissioning process, posing a series of 
challenges that have proved difficult to overcome. 
The multiplicity of concurrent problems is the 
main characteristic of the Fukushima 
decommissioning. The lack of a waste processing 
system for the treatment of spent fuel and cooling 
fluids, together with a severe lack of safe areas for 
the storage of irradiated materials add to the 
difficulty. Operators, who have to both manage 
the emergency and prepare for decommissioning, 
are in a particularly difficult situation, made worse 
by an unfavourable political and social climate.  
Our third example demonstrates that 
decommissioning can take place over an 
extremely long period of time, during which risks 
can be prioritised as action principles. This was 
the case for the decommissioning of Iraq’s nuclear 
facilities (Bibi et al. 2013). Beginning in the 
1950s, Iraqi facilities were constructed to support 
the development of the civilian and military 
nuclear industry. They underwent numerous 
bombings during military operations carried out 
by Israel (1981), the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988), 
and the wars of 1990–1991 and 2003. These 
bombings led to extensive destruction and the 
almost complete withdrawal of Iraq from the 
international nuclear community. The 2003 war 
resulted in the looting of around a dozen facilities, 
which led the government to draw up an ambitious 
decommissioning programme in order to rapidly 
secure installations for workers, the environment 
and the civilian population. In this case, 
contextual difficulties were due to several factors: 
the loss or absence of documentation concerning 
nuclear sites (which meant that knowledge had to 
be rediscovered), a lack of qualified personnel, the 
absence of a waste processing system and storage 
areas, and lack of experience in the field.  
3.3 The effect of unanticipated decommissioning 
on risks  
The above examples show that context is a 
fundamental element in the identification and 
categorisation of the risks of nuclear 
decommissioning. The contextualisation of 
decommissioning not only leads to the emergence 
of new risks that may be minimised or forgotten in 
the ideal decommissioning scenario, but it may 
also lead to a better understanding of the relative 
importance of risk factors.  
This question of anticipation and preparation 
for nuclear decommissioning has highlighted 
several fundamental points. The first concerns 
technical aspects of decommissioning related to 
the categorisation of zones and radiation mapping, 
which is a crucial stage in radiation risk 
management (Bayliss & Langley 2003). This is 
complicated by the changing nature of radiation 
contamination, particularly in plants that have 
been severely damaged, such as the Fukushima 
Dai-Ichi plant or the Iraqi nuclear facilities.  
A second important point is the existence or 
establishment of an effective and comprehensive 
waste processing chain, which impacts the 
management of the decommissioning timescale. 
National and international regulations can have an 
impact on the performance of such networks. 
However, the issue of nuclear waste goes far 
beyond the simple question of transport and 
storage. In this context, decommissioning is 
particularly pertinent as the concept of waste 
management is under constant review.  
The third particularly sensitive challenge 
relates to the economics and financial 
provisioning for decommissioning. This issue is 
particularly relevant to industrial and commercial 
facilities, where profitability is a fundamental 
issue, although it is also a concern for research 
facilities. The economic dimension of 
decommissioning impacts operations at many 
levels, of which the link between 
decommissioning and outsourcing is one example 
(Martin & Guarnieri 2013).  
Two other challenges relate to the 
organisational and human dimension of facilities.  
These concern motivation, commitment to change 
and timescales (Pelleterat de Borde 2013) on the 
one hand, the facility’s collective memory of 
technical and production history on the other. The 
managerial consequences of the transition from 
production are an important area identified by the 
IAEA in their discussion of decommissioning. 
Context has a significant impact on the motivation 
of the facility’s actors throughout the process. The 
establishment and maintenance of a collective 
memory (in technical, organisational and human 
terms) requires particular attention when 
decommissioning takes place over an extended 
period of time or is delayed.  
This examination of the decommissioning 
context shows that it is not possible to analyse it, 
or the risks that arise from it without taking into 
account the whole process, in technical, 
environmental and human terms, and from the 
financial and temporal angle. Decommissioning 
constitutes a multifaceted continuum of risk. If it 
is to be credible, a typology of risks must take into 
account the decommissioning context, the types of 
facilities and associated strategies. That is the 
subject of the last section of this article.  
4 A TYPOLOGY OF RISK  
Our risk typology is structured into three 
groups: technical and technological issues, the 
decommissioning project, and those related to 
human and organisational factors. These three risk 
categories are classified according to the extent to 
which they are understood and managed by the 
decommissioning industry.  
4.1 Technological risks  
The risks associated with reactor technology 
and decommissioning techniques are relatively 
well-known, and the implementation of counter-
measures is usually well-managed. The most 
familiar risk (specific to nuclear 
decommissioning) concerns ionising radiation. 
Both equipment and materials can be radioactive, 
and the protection of workers is a priority for 
operators. While during production, radiation 
levels are seen as a cost-benefit balance under the 
ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) 
principle, this approach is not viable during 
decommissioning (Bayliss & Langley 2003). Any 
immediate benefit does not justify exposure to 
radiation, and the entire operation is subject to 
maximum exposure limits. Although the risk of 
radiation and contamination is relatively well-
understood by operators, decommissioning 
constitutes a new challenge for radiation 
management.  
The second risk is more classical and concerns 
general occupational health and safety, i.e. 
physical risks to individuals. These risks are 
deeply embedded in construction and 
decommissioning culture. They concern work at 
height, handling of suspended loads, cutting and 
removal of equipment. They are the same in the 
nuclear environment as in other industries, and 
can be handled in the same way by operators.  
The third technical and technological risk 
concerns the type of facility and specific risks 
arising from its characteristics and functioning. It 
relates to chemical hazards that need to be 
removed or processed in order to reduce any 
potential interactions with decommissioning 
operations. In the case of powerful reactors, 
technology design is particularly important. For 
example, the handling of sodium in fast breeder 
reactors such as SuperPhénix incurs specific risks, 
which require processing techniques and the 
implementation of special protective measures.  
Radiation hazards, health risks and risks related 
to the characteristics of the facility itself and the 
safety of activities describe the hazards faced by 
operators and workers in the decommissioning 
process. In this category, techniques are most 
developed and reproducible, and research is likely 
to provide rapid solutions. This is not the case for 
risk associated with the overall decommissioning 
project.  
4.2 Project-related risks  
The inclusion of the overall process of 
decommissioning as a risk category is justified by 
the argument that the decommissioning context 
should routinely be integrated into a risk typology. 
Decommissioning is a complex, multi-
dimensional project, and each of its components – 
financial, administrative, waste management, 
environmental and impact on the public – form 
part of the overall risk environment.  
The first set of risks in this category concern 
project funding. Decommissioning is a non-
productive period and waste management requires 
extra efforts from which it is not always possible 
to create value in a conventional system. Securing 
dedicated funding for decommissioning is 
therefore a focal point for the smooth management 
of the project. At present, the real cost of 
decommissioning is uncertain due to the lack of a 
global decommissioning industry. Anticipated 
costs vary enormously, which makes provisioning 
both difficult and subjective (NEA/OECD 2003). 
Moreover, finance has implications at all levels in 
decommissioning management. It determines 
what resources are allocated to the safety and 
security of operations and it impacts the speed of 
decommissioning; a relevant concern from the 
point of view of the public and the environment. 
Every aspect of decommissioning is affected by 
economic and financial issues, which are 
absolutely crucial.  
However, decommissioning is also defined by 
its timeframe, which impacts the estimated cost of 
operations. Timescales link the facility being 
decommissioned to the industrial environment (in 
which waste management is paramount) and a 
complex administrative architecture. In turn, these 
two elements (administration and waste 
management) partially drive the timeframe. The 
administrative dimension is fundamental. In many 
nations the regulatory environment is uncertain 
and standards can change rapidly, which poses a 
significant risk to the economic viability of 
operations. In addition, administrative procedures 
have their own timescale that can impact 
decommissioning, and lead to transitional periods 
where organisational structures become 
complicated (Pelleterat de Borde et al. 2013). In 
France, the decree that led to the decommissioning 
of the Brennilis nuclear power plant was 
subsequently annulled by a civil action. This is an 
example of how decommissioning is temporally 
dependent on administrative processes. This can 
have a huge impact on costs, and lead the operator 
to change their future priorities.  
Finally, these examples show how an effective 
and comprehensive waste processing industry is 
one of the conditions for limiting risks to the 
population and the environment. Waste processing 
systems are still underdeveloped and experimental 
and there are multiple temporary storage areas. 
Waste is a social symbol of the risks of the nuclear 
industry and it has significant value for the 
civilian population. Waste management is linked 
to environmental risks that emerge or are 
exacerbated by decommissioning, which involves 
opening up facilities and the diffusion of materials 
that are to a greater or lesser extent radioactive. 
Techniques used by operators can be accompanied 
by waste discharge, which in theory is managed 
but may have an effect on the environment.  
Risks associated with decommissioning 
projects are currently the subject of close 
examination. One example is the establishment of 
a Decommissioning Risk Management Project as 
part of the International Decommissioning 
Network at the IAEA (François 2013). The 
management of various aspects of 
decommissioning is the focal point for many 
industrialists in the sector.  
However, in our view, this emphasis on 
administration, waste management and finance 
ignores a risk factor that is both the most 
important and the least well-managed: the 
organisational and human dimension. 
4.3 Human and organisational risks  
Human and organisational factors are without 
doubt an afterthought in decommissioning, despite 
the fact that they present their own risks. Even if 
the IAEA actually carries out, as it has said it will, 
a study on the management of collective memory, 
knowledge and the need for qualified personnel to 
handle the most sensitive phases of 
decommissioning, organisational effects remain 
relatively unexplored.  
A review of books and reports on nuclear 
decommissioning (such as the excellent work 
undertaken by Bayliss and Langley) is particularly 
illuminating in this respect. The organisational 
and human dimension occupies little more than 
one paragraph: “shut down of a plant also involves 
a major organisational change, often with a major 
reduction in staff numbers. This will be 
accompanied by significant cultural changes as the 
nature of the job changes, with a much greater 
focus on project management approach. A smooth 
transition process therefore needs to: 1) consider 
measures to identify and preserve key skills and 
knowledge, and 2) mitigate the impact of the 
changes on staff morale” (Bayliss & Langley 
2003). This is very similar to what the IAEA has 
highlighted in its reports. It is clear to 
international authorities that the maintenance of 
collective memory concerning the facility and the 
consolidation of skills are the most fundamental 
issues that must be addressed in order to deal with 
the risks mentioned above.  
However, organisational risk in nuclear 
decommissioning cannot be reduced to collective 
memory and the competence of agents. The 
transformation of the organisation marks a 
substantial change in an ecosystem that has 
developed throughout the plant’s operating period 
(Pelleterat de Borde et al. 2013). This 
transformation implies reaching a new structural 
equilibrium that can be a distortion of the 
organisational structures provided by 
management. The gap between the theoretical 
organisation and its reality is patently obvious, as 
in other complex industrial systems. Therefore, 
understanding the functioning of the organisation 
and its potential weaknesses is a fundamental 
issue in the decommissioning process and 
operators must acknowledge its importance for the 
overall safety of decommissioning.  
The important of organisational transformation 
was one of the points highlighted by the OECD in 
a technical note (NEA/OECD 2004). However, 
their warning was focused on an idea which is 
difficult to subscribe to. It is particularly evident 
in the note’s conclusion, “The regulator may 
reasonably expect the licensee to develop and 
implement a system for managing change which is 
comparable with the approach taken to managing 
plant and equipment change, and encourage self-
assessment as part of that system”. The idea here 
is that the nuclear operator is able (as with 
technical change) to understand, anticipate and 
address safety risks that accompany the 
organisational changes. However, current research 
has established that the operator does not know 
the organisational implications of the changes put 
in place, particularly with respect to system safety 
and reliability. This was highlighted by, among 
others, Mathilde Bourrier (2005). She argued that, 
“what managers mostly lack is knowledge of the 
implications of their organisational choices”. The 
beliefs of managers and operators are still very 
often rooted in a linear relationship between the 
desired and the actual, as far as the organisation is 
concerned, however the question of the smooth 
operation (or not) of the organisation in terms of 
the goals set for it is not enough (Pelleterat de 
Borde et al. 2013). The real challenge for risk 
management is to achieve a genuine 
understanding of the effects of organisational 
change, which can only be seen through a detailed 
analysis of the social recomposition that takes 
place in an organisation undergoing 
transformation.  
The transformation of the organisation and the 
gap between the desired and the actual 
organisation have a particular impact on the 
management of field operations that, as in the 
construction phase, are heavily outsourced (Martin 
& Guarnieri 2013). Management of concurrent 
activities (i.e. the planning and scheduling of 
operations) is a challenge that in turn influences 
the entire set of risk factors: exposure to radiation, 
occupational health and safety, financing and 
timescales. However, the management of 
operations is influenced by social acceptance of 
change and its indirect effects: distorted 
organisational structures, structural reorganisation 
that is not accompanied by corresponding changes 
in decision-making and communication loops, 
unmanaged responsibilities given to actors, and 
discrepancies between actual changes and those 
that were intended.  
This shows that the organisational dimension 
of decommissioning is still the subject of 
unrealistic representations of the relationship 
between the formal and informal organisation. 
The creation of a shared decommissioning culture 
in the wider organisation, including the operator 
and its subcontractors is still fundamentally 
limited and links between organisational, human 
and technical issues are not fully taken into 
account. It is just as important to understand and 
formalise organisational and human risks, so that 
that they are as well-managed as technical or 
environmental risks.  
5 CONCLUSION  
The identification and the treatment of risks in 
nuclear decommissioning is not an easy task. Far 
from being a conveniently uniform process, 
decommissioning involves an extremely complex 
set of very different situations, which each have 
their own challenges.  
Moreover, it is not a homogeneous field for 
research and the variety of facilities implies a 
hierarchy of risks. The economic, social, political 
and international context is another source of 
variability, which complicates the creation of a 
risk typology.  
However, it is possible, as we have seen, to 
identify three major risk areas, namely: technical 
and technological risks, risks related to 
decommissioning project and risks to the 
organisation that is responsible for on-site 
operations. We have shown how organisational 
risks have the greatest impact, but receive the least 
attention in the literature. In this context, this 
article is a call for greater attention to be given to 
organisational issues in nuclear decommissioning. 
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